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Abstract  
The enormous increase of energy prices from the 2000s onwards has aroused a 
considerable interest all over the world, nevertheless since 2014 has taken place a 
reverse shock. This has led to a sensible research which has produced new views and 
has raised the previous ones. This thesis therefore offers a review over the research 
referring to oil price shocks of the last years. It takes into account the fundamentals of 
crude oil prices, and gives an outline over research regarding oil shocks and 
transmission channels. This thesis examines the underlying factors behind the crude oil 
price changes, using a time-varying approach for the period from 1991 to 2014. By 
using a dynamic multivariate econometric model, I am able to identify and describe 
the structural changes in the crude oil market during the observed period. Empirical 
evidences are given for US, UK, Italy, Germany, Euro Area and Japan. 
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1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The idea of this thesis is to analyse the importance regarding a topical issue existing in  
almost every human activity which is shared worldwide and affects various channels 
having an impact on macroeconomic activity. 
By examining oil price changes and its consequences on various activities tied at 
economic cycles, it means to take into account many and complex economic 
mechanisms regulating the life of single states. 
The oil, being the most used commodity since the beginning of the last century, has 
become the essential element of capitalism at global level. Today it is possible to 
affirm that the “black gold” is the cause of wars and disasters, too. 
In the first chapter, I focus the attention on the dynamics which had affected the 
economy during the years referring at what happened in the history and how much 
important oil is for the stability of a country, focusing on oil prices and fluctuations 
since 70's shocks up to today, and what are the causes that determine the pressure on 
oil price. For doing that I mention studies done by scholars as Blanchard and Gali and 
Hamilton which evidenced differences 2000's shock w.r.t. 70's shocks. 
Then, in the second chapter, I point out the evolution of oil market facing the continue 
developments in oil demand and supply and relative decision-making by agents. In this 
sense I analyse the factors inside the global oil market that affect oil price changes, 
included the role of speculators which has been examined by scholars as Kilian, 
Murphy, Lee. In the last section of this chapter, I deal with oil nature and which are the 
most traded types of oil. 
In the third chapter, I develop an econometric investigation on the effects of oil price 
shocks on economic activity in countries like United States, United Kingdom, Italy, 
Germany, Euro Area and Japan, using the Structural Vector Autoregressive (SVAR) 
model referring to the effect of oil price on real GDP growth. 
Through the impulse response functions of the price of the commodity over the GDP I 
can show how the main economic variables react to the oil price fluctuations. 
 
2 
Chapter 1 
GENERAL VIEW ON FACTS RELATED TO OIL  
 
The causes of fluctuations in oil prices are varied and complex, as many are the 
consequences related to the price of oil itself. 
In this chapter I deal with the problem on a general level, bearing in mind the fact that 
oil - which since last century has become the most important raw material and energy 
source in many sectors at world level - has influenced the history of all countries. 
In fact, oil price fluctuations cause effects in various areas: production, employment, 
inflation, GDP, policy, consumers' behaviour. 
Oil owns by far the greatest value of traded primary commodities, making it of interest 
to exporters and importers alike.1 It is a key primary energy source and it is often 
argued that no other fuel can compete for many of its uses in terms of price and 
convenience. 
Usually, to analyse the problem from different perspectives, we start from the severe 
global economic recessions, which occurred in the 70's, which were linked in various 
ways to the shock of oil prices. 
Just from those years arose an intense debate in which scholars of different 
nationalities have expressed their views on the causes determining the price of oil and 
the relationship between this and the economic performance. 
Therefore, since then, the relationship between oil prices and economic growth is one 
of the major issues relating to the energy economy. 
 
1.1 Literature view 
A large body of research suggests that there is a significant effect of this energy over 
the economy, which has involved many scholars during the years.  
Scholars, reflecting on the events of the 70's, have raised the question whether the 
shock was due "to a new regime of price to induce the price at a level higher than the 
equilibrium levels previously registered, or whether the shock was generated 
                                                 1 Bacon, Robert. "Modelling the price of oil." Oxford Review of Economic Policy(1991): 17-34. 
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exclusively and limited by the unexpected supply contraction".2 
Thus, some scholars, such as Hamilton and Kilian have examined the relationship 
among energy prices, economic activity and the effects of increases in oil prices on 
output; others like Bohi (1989) and Bernanke (1997) analyzed the direct and indirect 
effects stemming from decisions taken by the central banks, in order to limit inflation 
caused by the rising oil price. 
In the analysis of the causes of oil shocks, it is emphasized the supply role (as 
happened in 1973, 1979, 1980 and 1990 when occurred the so-called supply-side 
shocks) and the one of demand (as happened in 2007-2008 when there was an 
unexpected and exuberant energy demand from emerging economies, such as India 
and China). 
In 2005, Hamilton after examining the American economy in the period between 1948 
and 1972, has concluded that an increase of 10% in oil prices has led to a reduction in 
the level of U.S. GDP growth of about 1.4%.. 
Other scholars, such as Rotemberg and Woodford (1996) have considered that for the 
same period a rise in oil prices of 10% caused a decrease of 2.5% of the U.S. GDP. 
Hence, by examining the various hypothesis we can say that it is difficult to arrive at 
viable solutions for every time and every place. 
In fact, situations are very different from many points of view and should be 
considered individually. 
Since the 1970s, and at least until recently, macroeconomists have viewed changes in 
the price of oil as an important source of economic fluctuations, as well as a paradigm 
of a global shock, likely to affect many economies simultaneously. Such a perception 
is largely due to the two episodes of low growth, high unemployment, and high 
inflation that characterized most industrialized economies in the mid and late 1970s.  
More recently, scholars like Blanchard and Gali (2007) and Hamilton (2008) examined 
the causes and consequences of 2007-2008 shock. 
Blanchard and Gali (2007) pointed out the fact that the increases in oil prices in recent 
years have caused lesser effects on prices, wages, output and employment w.r.t. the 
                                                 2 Relationship between oil price shock, economic growth and recession, Enciclopedie  
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70’s. 
Among the main causes of these changes they considered three hypotheses: 
- the real wage rigidities may have decreased over time. The presence of these   
  rigidities generated a trade-off between stabilization of inflation and stabilization of  
   the output gap; 
- changes in the way monetary policy is conducted may be responsible for the  
  differential response of the economy to the oil shocks. In particular, the stronger 
  commitment by Central banks to keeping a low and stable inflation rate,  
  reflected in the widespread adoption of more or less explicit inflation targeting      
  strategies, may have led to an improvement in the policy tradeoff that make it 
 possible to have a smaller impact of a given oil price increase on both inflation and 
output simultaneously; 
- the share of oil in the economy may have declined sufficiently since the 70's to 
account for the decrease in the effects of its price changes. Under that hypothesis, 
changes in the price of oil have increasingly turned into a sideshow, with no significant 
macroeconomic effects.3 
So, they characterize the macroeconomic performance of a set of industrialized 
economies in the aftermath of the oil price shocks of the 1970s and of the last decade, 
focusing on the differences across episodes. 
They reached these conclusions: 
- the effects of oil price shocks must have coincided in time with large shocks of a 
different nature. They have given some evidence that increases in other commodity 
prices were important in the 1970s, but they have not identified the other shocks for 
the 2000s. 
- the effects of oil price shocks have changed over time, with steadily smaller effects 
on prices and wages, as well as on output and employment; 
- a first plausible cause for these changes is a decrease in real wage rigidities. Such 
rigidities are needed to generate the type of large stagflation in response to adverse 
                                                 3 Blanchard, Olivier J., and Jordi Gali. The Macroeconomic Effects of Oil Shocks: Why are the 2000s so different from the 1970s?. No. w13368. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2007 
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supply shocks such as those that took place in the 1970s. They have shown that the 
response of the consumption wage to the marginal rate of substitution, and thus to 
employment, appears to have increased over time; 
- a second plausible cause for these changes is the increased credibility of monetary 
policy. They have offered a simple formalization of lack of credibility and its effect on 
the volatility frontier. They have shown that the response of expected inflation to oil 
shocks has substantially decreased over time; 
- a third plausible cause for these changes is simply the decrease in the share of oil in 
consumption and in production. The decline is large enough to have quantitatively 
significant implications. 
The mechanisms through which oil price changes affect economic activity include 
both supply and demand channels.  
Despite the substantial research on the impact of oil prices on economic activity, the 
understanding of the transmission channels through which oil prices affect economic 
activity is far from a consensus.  
Moreover, the way oil prices influence the economy and the magnitude of their effects 
may have evolved through time.  
The mechanisms which were at work during the first two shocks in the 1970's are not 
necessarily the same today (since the beginning of the 2000s).  
Indeed according to Hamilton (2009) the oil price hike of the 2000s, especially in 
2007-08 was one of the biggest shocks to oil prices on record, however, the causes 
were quite different from the events of those of the 1970s.  
Moreover, Hamilton (2009) notes that the impact on the economy of both oil 
importing and exporting countries is somewhat less than previous oil price shocks. 
While the historical oil price shocks were primarily caused by significant disruption in 
crude oil production that were brought about by largely exogenous geopolitical events, 
Hamilton (2009) argued that the 2007-08 event has not been that of a reduction in 
supply, but a failure of production to increase between 2005 and 2007.4 
                                                 4 Hamilton, James D. Causes and Consequences of the Oil Shock of 2007-08. No. w15002. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2009. 
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In turn Hamilton, after examining the 2008 oil shock, showed that among the 
determining causes there were certainly:  
- the lack of price elasticity of demand, strong growth in emerging economies; 
-  the inability of global production to satisfy the requests. 
Hamilton explores similarities and differences between the run-up of oil prices in 
2007–08 and earlier oil price shocks, looking at what caused these price increases and 
what effects they had on the economy. Whereas previous oil price shocks were 
primarily caused by physical disruptions of supply, the price run-up of 2007–08 was 
caused by strong demand confronting stagnating world production.  
Even as global supply stagnated, global demand was growing strongly. Particularly 
noteworthy is oil consumption in China. Chinese consumption in 2007 was 870,000 
barrels a day higher than just two years earlier. 
Although the causes were different, the consequences for the economy appear to have 
been similar to those observed in earlier episodes, with significant effects on 
consumption spending and purchases of domestic automobiles in particular. Absent 
those declines, it is unlikely that the period 2007Q4–2008Q3 would have been 
characterized as one of recession for the United States. This episode should thus be 
added to the list of U.S. recessions to which oil prices appear to have made a material 
contribution. 
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The figure above shows that price of oil has been anything but stable over the last four 
decades. A series of dramatic events in the 1970s sent the price of crude oil over $40 a 
barrel by the end of that decade, which would be over $100 a barrel at current prices.  
Three events over this period—the Iranian revolution in the fall of 1978, Iraq’s 
invasion of Iran in September 1980, and Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990—
resulted in dramatic and immediate disruption of the flow of oil from key global 
producers. In each episode, increased production in other countries partially mitigated 
the consequences. 
The single most important fact for understanding short-run changes in the price of oil 
is that income rather than price is the key determinant of the quantity demanded.  
The Oil Shock of 2007–08 is episode qualified as one of the biggest shocks to oil prices on 
record. 
U.S. consumption in 2007 was 122,000 barrels a day below its level in 2005; 
meanwhile Europe’s daily consumption dropped by 346,000 barrels and Japan’s by 
318,000 barrels. What persuaded residents of these countries to reduce oil 
consumption in the face of rising incomes? The answer is a rising price of oil. 
Global growth in petroleum demand in recent years is thus quite exceptional. And 
although there have been other episodes when global oil production stagnated over a 
two-year period, these were inevitably either responses to falling demand during 
recessions or the physical supply disruptions detailed above. 
 
1.2 Policy influences 
As we have seen, the extended literature related to economic energy demonstrates that 
there is no uniformity of thought about the causes of oil price fluctuations and the 
consequences that these have produced on the economy. 
Nevertheless, it is possible to find some ideas shared in general: 
- the significant oil demand growth from China, the Middle East and other emerging 
economies has contributed to the instability in oil price; 
- the increase in oil prices produces asymmetric effects w.r.t. the reductions on 
production and economic growth; 
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- since the 70's the recessions are attributed to the oil shocks, but not all shocks are to 
be tied to a recession. 
Actually today, more than ever before, the price of oil is the result of many factors and, 
at the same time, the barrel price in different ways increasingly affect the livelihood of 
citizens, both in terms of the fuel price and for many goods and services needed. 
In fact today, the dynamics that regulate the establishment of oil price are very 
different w.r.t. the past where had a key and exclusive role producers, such as OPEC 
and non-OPEC.  
A determinant role had assumed the figure of traders, professionals including those 
who are neither interested in the physical supply of oil nor a need to hedge the risk of 
price fluctuations. 
They invest in oil through the use of futures and, resorting to speculative operations, 
strongly influence the oil market. 
For years now we can speak of Warfare Energy, i.e. the oil used as a strategic weapon. 
As an historical example it can just mention what happened in 1973 during the conflict 
Egypt Israel. 
The Arab oil producers, who supported Egypt and Syria, resorted to the embargo on oil 
supplies, hoping that US and Western Europe would force Israel to withdraw from all 
the occupied territories since 1967 and those subsequently won. 
In 1974 the embargo was suspended, but the oil-producing countries increased 
exponentially the crude oil price. 
'The embargo and the rise in world oil prices ushered in a new era in international 
economic and policies relations, and their impact went far beyond the conflict in the 
Middle East'.5 
Today's economic security has become a strategic imperative for every state. 
History has taught that the various recessions that in the years followed one another, 
regardless the causes that gave rise, caused disastrous effects on economic activity in 
general and also on the lives of citizens. 
But today more than ever, because of the complexity of the dynamics that underlie 
                                                 5 Palmer R., Colton I., History modern world. From the First World War to the present, Rome 1985, pp.239-240 
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economic activities, it is necessary that each state will ensure economic efficiency, 
primarily through the knowledge and the ability to predict what might be the 
guidelines in the energy field. 
So, would be indispensable adequate policies that resorted to the two fundamental 
options: 
- diversification; 
- domestic production.6 
As regards diversification, nowadays in Europe there have been gains in efficiency and 
technological changes just because of the fluctuations in oil prices. 
As an example we can cite the development of the nuclear industry in France, after the 
first oil shock, 
Since 1974 the US Congress enacted the first legislation to encourage research in the 
solar industry. 
Even Italy, in 1974, a law was passed in favor of energy saving and efficiency. In 
1982, after the second oil shock, it was enacted the law on the national energy plan, 
with a particular emphasis on renewable energy, energy saving and rational use of 
energy. This legislation has continued, not without difficulty, with the 1991 law, the 
application of which was deferred to a subsequent decree but never saw the light7.  
China, whose largest oil field, the Daquing Field, in 2007 produced 41.6 tons of oil, 
has pledged to reduce by 2060 the production of 8.6 million tons. And in the 
development plan 2011-2015 confirms the commitment to increase the use of non-
fossil sources, with the aim of meeting by 2020 the 15% of energy needs. 
A central role is reserved for hydropower and wind power, for which China is showing 
today the highest global rate of growth. 
In addition, China is also the world leader in solar thermal technology, both in 
households, both in exports.8 
However, China has an economic growth model at high risk, based on massive 
                                                 6 Energy Warfare: Year In Review 2014,Britannic Enciclopedie 7 Price of Oil not only decides OPEC, Energy efficiency, A.Lanza, 2014 8 C.Tintori, Green economy, 07-08-2011 
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exploitation of mineral resources and a high consumption of oil resources. 
As for the use of diversification in the energy field, some scholars believe there are at 
least two major obstacles: the cost of the replacement and the cost of the transition. 
For the transition, for example, you must be a technology that allows the use of 
different energy source. For the substitute, if its cost is higher than that of the original 
source of energy, the change tends to contract the economy. 
On the other side there is domestic production, which include the United States that 
now will import about 4.5 million barrels of crude per day, a decrease of 24% since 
1986. 
Today in fact the two most common types of oil are WTI and Brent. The first is 
extracted in the US, particularly in Texas, the latter especially in the North Sea. 
The US stocks at the end of September 2015 increased by 3.9 million barrels. 
In early October 2015, futures on WTI, due in November, the Nymex gained 4.9% to 
48.53 per barrel.9 
Even in Italy, not without strong controversy, it emphasizes the research in an effort to 
lower much the imports. 
The reality today, because of the complexity of the mechanisms of which it has been 
said, it is essential that use is made of tools reading events and interpretations of them; 
stresses that come from events that are to be studied and understood as signs of 
breaking or exceeding the "traditional rhythms": supply and demand, production-
consumption, small-economy macroeconomics, globalization unsustainable-autarky. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                  9 Petroleum, British. "BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2015.", 
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Chapter 2 
OIL PRICE FLUCTUATIONS AND DETERMINANT FACTORS 
  
In this section I deal with ways regarding the two sides for the role they assume in the 
oil market, as already mentioned. 
Even in this area, the forecasts are extremely uncertain, because there are many 
unknowns. 
The same parameters of evaluation for projections in the medium-long term, are so 
many and different from each other that the conclusions of the analysts often are 
literally opposite. 
In fact uncertainties, are largely due to the results of operations for the search for new 
wells, to the behaviour especially from emerging economies, to the speculative 
interventions and in what particular moments you can check the "peak" of the 
worldwide production. 
If in fact on the basis of the mathematical model developed in 1956 by the American 
scholar Hubbert is possible to calculate with some accuracy the peak of a single oil 
field or an area more or less extended geologically equal, it is very difficult to 
calculate the peak of production at world level. The most important variables in this 
area depend on for example the price of oil and the same assessment whether it is more 
or less convenient to continue to extract from certain wells, or the techniques used for 
extraction. 
According to CERA (Cambridge Energy Research Associates), the institute for the 
study of energy problems most famous in the world, in 2010 it will lead to a 
significant surplus of crude oil over demand. 
Eni also believes that for gas and for oil in the future there will be no problems of oil 
availability. 
This even though the demand for petroleum products for transport in recent years has 
increased dramatically. 
Scholars predicted that while worldwide in 1980 36% of a barrel was intended to 
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transport, before 2010 would have exceeded 50%.10 
Consider that in the US demand for petroleum products for transport came to 80% and 
in Italy has exceeded 80%. 
Today the car, among the means of transport is the one that consumes more petroleum 
products (90% in the United States, 80% in Europe, 60% in Japan). 
Analysts predict that in 2030 the vehicles on the road worldwide will be about 1.2 
billion, hence there will need always more petroleum available11. 
Structural conditions in each country's economy further influence the relationship 
between oil prices and economic growth.  
Developing countries tend to have a greater proportion of their economies in 
manufacturing industries, which are more energy intensive than service industries. 
Although transportation oil use is usually a smaller share of total oil consumption in 
non-OECD countries, this use tends to increase rapidly as expanding economies 
increase the need to move goods and people.  
What is now a matter of debate among analysts in the energy sector is the oil shock of 
2015 in reverse. 
Between 2014 and 2015, in less than a year the price of crude oil has fallen sharply 
until reaching $ 44 a barrel. 
In previous years, crude oil prices had reached $ 150 per barrel, in June 2014 a barrel 
cost about $ 117, to $ 70 in December of the same year, in 2015 the price has come 
down to $ 44 with a trend that does not seem disappear. 
This phenomenon is not easily understood by the fact that the price collapse occurred 
even if those areas that produced and exported large amounts of oil in the world, such 
as Libya and Iraq, because of the serious geopolitical crises are entering in the world 
market more than 4 million barrels per day less than in the past. 
Also monetary instability, considering the fact that Euro and Dollar run after might 
cause speculation. 
 
                                                 10 Zorzoli G.B. e Ragozzino G., A world of reserve, 2006 
11 Volpi A., The oil shock of 2015 
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So what are the causes of the collapse in oil prices between 2014 and 2015? 
These would be the most important reasons: 
- the imbalance between supply and demand, recorded in these last few years. In fact, 
world demand for oil today is around 91 million barrels a day, in front of a rise of the 
bid increment. In 2014, demand increased of 0.7%, while the supply has increased by 
more than 2%. From this, production has increased in many areas, but especially in the 
United States where research and abstraction techniques have allowed them to be self-
sufficient and to export nearly 7.5 million daily barrels. 
- the decision by Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries not to regulate their production 
in order to originate a prices recovery, but they preferred to supply the world market 
leaving lower the prices further. Their goal was to seriously affect new entrants such as 
Russia and Iran, who are not able to extract at such low prices. In fact, the cost of 
extraction of a barrel in the Persian Gulf is slightly greater than 5$ and in Russia is 
often 10 times higher. This clearly damages the large Russian state companies and all 
those areas where the costs of extraction are higher. At the same time, Saudi Arabia 
and the Gulf countries, possess many reserves to be able to supply the markets for 
years, and so they can accept a phase with lower prices, to delete competitor, and 
possibly the right time to make up prices; 
- it seems to have disappeared upward speculation on oil prices. First in fact, the high 
price of oil was not always due to the real dynamic of between supply and demand, but 
to speculative operations which generally were based on the belief that China and 
emerging countries would continue the strong demand for energy. So in the 
financialization of oil, securities tied to this were continually rising.  
Today, however, “most of these securities have been significantly reduced, while those 
that are still in circulation are betting on the fall with the result that the price of oil 
continues its fall”. 
It is clear that the phenomenon of today, as happens when the price increases, will 
have global consequences. 
As regards Italy, in these last two years the energy cost is much reduced. 
It is expected that in 2015 will save 6-7 billion, while in 2014 they had already saved 
14 
11 billion compared to previous years. 
Some analysts will have to wait until at least the end of 2016 because there is a new 
balance between supply and demand and a new support for oil prices.  
However you should be aware that any day now the situation could change and that it 
is necessary in any event find the most appropriate strategies to ensure the efficiency 
and economic security. 
 
2.1 What drive crude oil prices ? 
Oil prices are influenced by a number of factors, including some such as speculation as 
said above, that are mainly short-term impacts. Other factors, such as Opec production 
decisions and expectation about future world demand for oil, affect prices in the longer 
term.  
Supply and demand in the world oil market are balanced through responses to price 
movements, and the factors underlying supply and demand expectations are numerous 
and complex. 
EIA12 is actively examining the role of both supply-demand fundamentals and other 
factors in oil price formation, in fact according to EIA (2012), the key factors 
determining long-term supply, demand and prices for petroleum and other liquids can 
be summarized in four broad categories: the economics of non-OPEC supply; OPEC 
investment and production decisions; the economics of other liquids supply; and world 
demand for petroleum and other liquids. 
Now it's important to enlarge the view referred to the sides of production and 
consumption giving a general overview on global economic growth and the oil market. 
 
2.1.1  Supply side 
There was once a time in which a few oil companies played a big role in world oil 
                                                 12 The Energy Information Administration (EIA). An independent agency within the U.S. Department of Energy that develops surveys, collects energy data, and analyzes and models energy issues. The Agency must meet the requests of Congress, other elements within the Department of Energy, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the Executive Branch, its own independent needs, and assist the general public, or other interest groups, without taking a policy position.  
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markets, that era is long past.13 In the modern era, it is sovereign countries rather than 
private companies. 
OPEC’s role is a critical factor in determining long-term oil supply because oil 
resource is only available in limited amount within a particular geographical 
distribution, and crude oil produced by OPEC is an important factor which affects oil 
price. 
More than 80% of the world's proven oil reserves are concentrated in just 10 countries. 
Venezuela holds the world's biggest proven oil reserve followed by Saudi Arabia while 
Canada and Russia hold the third and the eighth largest oil reserves.  
OPEC Member Countries have made significant additions to their oil reserves in 
recent years, for example, by adopting best practices in the industry, realizing intensive 
explorations and enhanced recoveries. As a result, OPEC's proven oil reserves 
currently stand at 1,206.00 billion barrels, as shown in the figure below.14 
 
OPEC spare capacity provides an indicator of the world oil market's ability to respond 
to potential crises that reduce oil supplies. As a result, oil prices tend to incorporate a 
rising risk premium when OPEC spare capacity reaches low levels. From 2003 
through 2008, OPEC's total spare capacity remained near or below 2 million barrels 
                                                 13 Hamilton, James D. Understanding crude oil prices. No. w14492. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2008. 14 OPEC, OPEC. "Annual Statistical Bulletin 2014/2015." Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, Vienna, Austria (2015)   
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per day (or less than 3 percent of global supply), which provided very little cushion for 
fluctuations in supply in a context of rapidly rising demand. Markets are influenced by 
geopolitical events within and between OPEC countries because they have, 
historically, resulted in reductions in oil production. Given OPEC's market 
significance, events that entail an actual or future potential loss of oil supplies can 
produce strong reactions in oil prices.15 
Oil production from countries outside the OPEC currently represents about 60 percent 
of world oil production. Key centers of non-OPEC production include North America, 
regions of the former Soviet Union, and the North Sea. 
There are differences between OPEC and non-OPEC: 
- OPEC oil production is subject to central coordination whereas non-OPEC producers 
make independent decisions about oil production; 
- OPEC oil production is mostly in the hands of national oil companies (NOCs), 
international or investor-owned oil companies (IOCs) perform most of the production 
activities in non-OPEC countries. IOCs seek primarily to increase shareholder value 
and make investment decisions based on economic factors. While some NOCs operate 
in a similar manner as IOCs, many have additional objectives such as providing 
employment, infrastructure, or revenue that impact their country in a broader sense. As 
a result, non-OPEC investment, and thus future supply capability, tends to respond 
more readily to changes strictly in market conditions. 
Hence, producers in non-OPEC countries are generally regarded as price takers, that 
is, they respond to market prices rather than attempt to influence prices by managing 
production. As a result, non-OPEC producers tend to produce at or near full capacity 
and so have little spare capacity. Other things being equal, lower levels of non-OPEC 
supply tend to put upward pressure on prices by decreasing total global supply and 
increasing the "call on OPEC". The greater the call on OPEC, the greater is its likely 
ability to influence prices. 
Non-OPEC production occurs largely in areas that have relatively high finding and 
                                                 15  Energy & Financial Markets, What Drives Crude Oil Prices, An analysis of 7 factors that influence oil markets, Supply:OPEC 
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production costs, as most of the lower cost conventional oil resources are in OPEC 
member countries. Non-OPEC producers have therefore led the way into frontier areas 
such as the deepwater offshore, and pursued unconventional sources such as oil sands. 
As a result, non-OPEC production usually has a cost disadvantage compared to OPEC 
production. 
Non-OPEC producers have often led in developing new production technology. While 
this has sometimes resulted in the development of higher-cost supplies, costs often fall 
as technology advances, which can ultimately put downward pressure on prices.16 
 
2.1.2 Demand side 
The consumption side consists of hundreds of millions of us, who individually have 
limited power to influence prices, but collectively have plenty.  
Asia Pacific and North America have the highest oil consumption in 2014, accounting 
almost 60% of global oil consumption.17 
Total oil consumption for Asia Pacific and North America in 2014 are 30,85 mb/d and 
23.34 mb/d respectively.  
Over the past two decades, Asia Pacific's oil consumption almost doubled from 13,81 
mb/d in 1990 to 27,76 mb/d in 2010, up to 30,85 mb/d of 2014, mainly driven by 
economic growth in the region, particularly from China and India. China, with 11,056 
mb/d accounts for one thirds (33.25%) of total oil consumption in the region in 2014 
while India's oil consumption is 3,846 mb/d.  
United States is by far the largest crude oil consumer with a daily oil consumption of 
19,035 mb/d in 2014.  
However, oil consumption has peaked sometime between 2000 and 2010 as total oil 
consumption in 2000 (19.701 mb/d) is slightly more than 2010 which is also the case 
with so many other advanced countries of the OECD.  
Multinational organisations such the International Energy Agency (IEA) and the EIA 
have suggested that the decline in oil consumption is partly due to efficiency 
                                                 16 Energy & Financial Markets, What Drives Crude Oil Prices, An analysis of 7 factors that influence oil markets, Supply:Non-OPEC 17 Petroleum, British. "BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2015."  
18 
improvements (or in other words efficiency gains). 
Europe and Eurasia present a very interesting trend in oil consumption over the past 
two decades. The region has the highest oil consumption (23.24 mb/d) in 1990 before 
declining to 19.582 mb/d in 2000 and 19,125 mb/d in 2010, up to 18,252 of 2014.   
While the slight decline between 2000 and 2014 could be attributed to efficiency 
gains, the drastic fall between 1990 and 2000 was mainly due to fuel switching from 
oil to other sources for electricity generation in the Former Soviet Union.  
Oil consumption has doubled in the Middle East between 1990 and 2010 and almost 
doubled in South/Central America and Africa. 
Oil consumption in developing countries that are not part of the Organization of 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has risen sharply in recent years. 
While oil consumption in the OECD countries declined between 2000 and 2010, non-
OECD oil consumption increased more than 40 percent.  
China, India, and Saudi Arabia had the largest growth in oil consumption among the 
countries in the non-OECD during this period. 
There is a strong relationship between GDP growth rates and growth in oil 
consumption in non-OECD countries. Since 2001, oil consumption in non-OECD 
countries declined only in the fourth quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009. 
Increased demand pressure due to economic growth overwhelmed any downward 
pressure on oil consumption due to higher prices.18 
Rising oil consumption reflects rapid economic growth in these countries. Current and 
expected levels of economic growth heavily influence global oil demand and oil 
prices. Commercial and personal transportation activities, in particular, require large 
amounts of oil and are directly tied to economic conditions. Many manufacturing 
processes consume oil as fuel or use it as feedstock, and in some non-OECD countries, 
oil remains an important fuel for power generation. Because of these uses, oil prices 
tend to rise when economic activity and in turn oil demand is growing strongly. Many 
non-OECD countries are also experiencing rapid growth in population, which is an 
                                                 18 Energy & Financial Markets, What Drives Crude Oil Prices, An analysis of 7 factors that influence oil markets, Demand:non-OECD 
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additional factor supporting strong oil consumption growth. 
The Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) consists of the 
United States, much of Europe, and other advanced countries. At 53 percent of world 
oil consumption in 2010, these large economies consume more oil than the non-OECD 
countries, but have much lower oil consumption growth.  
So, generally growth in oil consumption over the past decade is mainly supported by 
the developing regions. 
 
2.1.3  The world of futures traders 
Nowadays the global oil market is influenced by futures traders which are all kinds of 
people come to futures exchanges to buy and sell futures and options contracts. 
Futures trading involves anyone in the world who wants either to manage the risk of 
price fluctuations, or to make profits over those fluctuations. 
These traders are interested in two types of trading: hedging and speculating. 
The hedger buys futures contracts because he wants to protect himself from price 
swings in the future. By using futures to lock in a future price for a product, he makes 
his costs – and his profits – more predictable. In other words, he trades futures to 
drive risk out of his business. 
But that risk doesn’t just disappear into thin air – it gets transferred to the speculator. 
The speculator accepts price risk in pursuit of profit. Speculators have no interest in 
owning the product being traded, but they are interested in the contracts for those 
products. Think of it like investing – buying and selling futures contracts in order to 
make a profit when prices move in the right direction. 
Hedgers and speculators go hand in hand – if you took one away, there simply would 
be no market. Hedgers transfer risk, and speculators absorb that risk. It takes both 
types of traders to bring balance to the market and keep trades moving back and forth. 
So, the speculator plays an essential role in keeping effective markets because they 
assume the risk that other market participants  may not want.19 
                                                 19 Büyüksahin, Bahattin, and Jeffrey H. Harris. "Do speculators drive crude oil futures prices." Energy Journal 32.2 (2011): 167-202. 
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The speculator anticipates future price movements and accept market risk in an 
attempt to profit from buying and selling futures and options contracts. 
In the oil market the participation of speculators adds liquidity to the markets. 
This liquidity helps to moderate price swings and closes the gap between bids to buy 
and offers to sell. 
Many people think that crude oil price is determined by the facts that demand meets 
supply, but unfortunately it is not so. 
The main cause of noteworthy variations of oil barrel quotations is researched in the 
strong speculative pressures on futures of hedge funds. 
Hence, oil trade is passed from the supremacy of physical oil buyers and sellers at the 
moment, towards a market in which the relationship between the oil demand and 
supply doesn't establish prices anymore, fostering speculation without any rules on 
futures where people bet of a given crude oil price in a precisely future data, generally 
in 30,60 or 90 days. 
The Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (CFMA) ensured 
modernized regulation of financial products known as over-the-counter (OTC) 
derivatives, which are deregulate markets among oil futures financial institutions, 
without governmental surveillance which would be done by Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission (CFTC).20 
So, oil price tendency is very influenced by speculative activity of few large 
companies, joined with big petroleum groups and it is far from reality of real oil 
barrels demand and supply. 
Speculators, that’s banks and/or hedge funds, control about 80% of energy futures 
markets. 
Unfortunately the U.S. deregulation, with the U.S. Congress favor at Wall Street 
approved several laws to support  banks interested at oil futures trade, so this facilitate 
the excessive speculation and handling of energy prices from big banks and funds. 
Hence, speculation adds an extraordinary extra charge to oil, so it could be defined 
                                                 20 Greenberger, Michael. "Out of the black hole: regulatory reform of the over-the-counter derivatives market." U of Maryland Legal Studies Research Paper2010-51 (2010). 
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more than a market, “a casinò” where there is oil in form of paper, and the permissive 
U.S. govern regulation on petroleum markets created ideal conditions in base of which 
few bank and financial institutions, control oil futures world market, and can create 
huge variations in the short-term in price that people pay for oil, fuel and other 
products stem from oil. 
Unlike most products, oil prices are not determined entirely by supply, demand and 
market sentiment toward the physical product. Rather, supply, demand and sentiment 
toward oil futures contracts, which are traded heavily by speculators, play a dominant 
role in price determination. 
Cyclical trends in the commodities market may also play a role. Regardless of how the 
price is ultimately determined, based on its use in fuels and countless consumer goods, 
it appears that oil will continue to be in high demand for the foreseeable future. 
As part of its Energy and Financial Markets Initiative, EIA is assessing the various 
factors that may influence oil prices — physical market factors as well as those related 
to trading and financial markets, it describes 7 key factors that could influence oil 
markets. The analysis explores possible linkages between each factor and oil prices. 
EIA's traditional coverage of physical fundamentals such as energy consumption, 
production, inventories, spare production capacity, and geopolitical risks continues to 
be essential. EIA is also assessing other influences, such as futures market trading 
activity, as it seeks to fully assess energy price movements. 
There has been much debate in recent years about the possibility that trades of 
financial investors in oil futures markets may have caused the surge in the real price of 
oil between 2003 and mid-2008.   
For this reason some authors expressed a view looking at the increase in oil prices 
since 2004 coincided with: 
- large flow of investment into commodity markets (financial institutions invested 
billions of dollars in futures markets and assets allocated to commodity index trading 
increased from 13$ billion to 260$ billion between 2004 and 2007); 
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-  Increased price co-movement between different commodities.21 
"The increase in oil prices has not been driven by supply and demand".22  
"The sharp increases and extreme volatility of oil prices have led observers to suggest 
that some part of the rise in prices reflects a speculative component arising from the 
activities of traders in the oil markets”.23 
By examining the effects of oil shocks (supply, global demand, oil inventory demand, 
speculation) and analyzing the transmission of oil shocks to a large number of 
variables, showing the role of speculation compared with supply and demand factors 
as drivers of oil prices, the findings are: 
- global demand shocks are the main drivers of oil price fluctuations; 
- speculative shocks are the second most important driver; 
- positive comovement between oil prices and the price of other commodities was 
driven mainly by global demand shocks followed by speculative shocks, So 
speculation also played a role. 
Hence, about the 2003-08 oil price shock there was no evidence that supply shocks 
were behind the oil price increase whereas strong evidence that a booming world 
economy was the cause of the price increase and obviously speculation also played a 
role. 
Speculative demand shock in Kilian and Murphy (2011) is a shock to the demand of 
inventories arising from:  
- expected shortfalls of future oil supply relative to future oil demand; 
- increased uncertainty in the oil market; 
- speculative activity 
- producers (partially) accommodate the higher demand. 
They name this shock oil inventory demand shock. 
       
                                                 21 Juvenal, L., and Petrella, I. Speculation in the oil market. Journal of Applied Econometrics, 2014 22 Lord Browne, Group Chief Executive of British Petroleum (2006) 
23 Bernanke, Ben S. "Remarks by Governor Ben S. Bernanke." at the meetings of the Eastern Economic 
Association, Washington, DC. Vol. 20. 2004. 
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2.1.4 Study of oil price fluctuations by adding inventories 
I connect this topic to a specifc study of scholars as Kilian and Murphy (2013) 
identifying speculative demand shocks and including oil inventories as an additional 
variable. 
When speculation is short in duration, it has the weakest impact on oil prices and 
demand shocks have the largest. However, when speculation is allowed to have short- 
and long-term effects, it is the main contributor to the volatility of oil prices.24 
Kilian (2009) broke with the tradition of assuming most oil price changes reflect 
exogenous supply shocks, he emphasized that fluctuations in global crude oil spot 
prices25 also reflect global economic conditions.  
Using a structural vector auto regressive (SVAR) model, he showed that global flow 
supply shocks have actually contributed very little to oil price movements when 
compared to global flow demand shocks, especially during the last decade. 
However, since it is possible to store oil, changes in oil inventories are possibly a third 
driver behind oil price fluctuations.  
Of particular interest are changes in the demand for inventories arising from 
speculative motives, that is, changes driven by expectations of future price changes. 
Indeed, Kilian and Murphy (2013) have extended the Kilian (2009) model, identifying 
speculative demand shocks and including oil inventories as an additional variable.  
In a rational expectations world, speculation reflects the forward-looking nature of 
economic agents who manage inventories to smooth their oil consumption and 
production over time—paying attention to the expected future path of the oil price. 
Moreover, in a rational expectations world, such speculation helps to stabilize spot 
prices when there are temporary demand or supply shocks. For example, if spot prices 
rise (fall) because flow production (demand) temporarily drops due to a supply 
(demand) shock, inventory holders can realize profits by selling (buying) stocks, 
which they can replenish (sell) later at a lower (higher) price.  
This release (stocking up) of inventories will increase (decrease) the effective supply 
                                                 24 Beidas-Strom S. and Pescatori A.. "Oil Price Volatility and the Role of Speculation." (2014). 25 Spot price:The price for a one-time open market transaction for immediate delivery of a specific quantity of product at a specific location where the commodity is purchased "on the spot" at current market rates. 
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in the market, which in turn will dampen (push up) the spot price response to the 
supply (demand) shock.  
From this vantage point, speculative demand simply represents rational decisions of 
adjusting above-the-ground holdings of oil inventories in anticipation of price 
movements as new information arrives on future market conditions.  
In other words, economic agents manage inventories to smooth their oil consumption 
and production over time, given the expected future path of the oil price.  
Changes in speculative demand are therefore a response to expected changes in oil 
market fundamentals - also known as news shocks26, such as oil discoveries, 
expectations of production disruptions, backstop technologies, and changes in world 
real interest rates or in global demand growth.27 
Their identification strategy rests on the assumption that unobservable shifts in 
expectations about future oil prices must be reflected in shifts in the demand for 
above-ground crude oil inventories. Their main finding is that speculative demand 
(along with flow supply) has played only a modest role in driving the real oil price 
(including the buildup of 2003–08) - with flow demand being the main driver. This 
result was later confirmed by Kilian and Lee (2013), using propriety global data on 
inventories.  
Kilian and Lee focused on the role of inventories or stocks of crude oil for the 
determination of the real price of oil.  
The fact that crude oil is storable allows market participants to speculate in oil by 
storing purchases of oil for future use in anticipation of rising prices. Shifts in 
expectations about future oil prices may greatly and immediately influence the real 
price of oil by shifting the speculative demand for oil.  
Indeed, such speculative demand shifts have been held responsible for the remarkable 
surge in oil and other industrial commodity prices that took place between 2003 and 
mid-2008.  
                                                 26 Jaimovich, Nir, and Sergio Rebelo. Can news about the future drive the business cycle?. No. w12537. 
National Bureau of Economic Research, 2006.  
27 Beidas-Strom, Samya, and Andrea Pescatori. "Oil Price Volatility and the Role of Speculation." (2014). 
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Compared with markets for other storable commodities, the market for crude oil lends 
itself to a formal econometric analysis of this question not only because of the 
importance of crude oil for the global economy, but because of the availability of 
monthly global data on oil production and above-ground oil inventories dating back 
many years. Even for crude oil, however, the quality of the inventory data is less than 
perfect.28 
Kilian and Lee examined for the first time the evolution of the real price of oil since 
2010 confirming that for this period as well, flow demand shocks have been the 
primary driver of the real price of oil. 
Then they also examined the role of speculative shocks. It has been conjectured that 
the Libyan Revolution in early 2011 affected the real price of oil by shifting 
speculative demand, as shown in the figure below.29 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Their first study is to examine this question formally. They provided evidence that the 
Libyan crisis indeed shifted expectations in oil markets, resulting in a price increase of 
between 3 and 13 dollars, depending on the specification of oil inventories. This 
increase is short-lived and not related to the Arab Spring more generally.                                                   28 Kilian, Lutz, and Thomas K. Lee. "Quantifying the speculative component in the real price of oil: The role of global oil inventories." Journal of International Money and Finance 42 (2014): 71-87. 29 Baumeister, Christiane, and Lutz Kilian. "Real-time forecasts of the real price of oil." Journal of Business & 
Economic Statistics 30.2 (2012): 326-336. 
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In fact, there is no evidence that the Arab Spring caused an increase in speculative 
demand in 2011. With regard to tensions with Iran in early 2012 (ranging from the 
decision to impose an EU oil import embargo to the Iranian nuclear threat), the 
evidence is more mixed. The implied price premium ranges from 0 to 9 dollars, 
depending on the specification.  
Finally, we found no indication that higher demand for strategic oil inventories from 
emerging Asia (or for that matter Iranian storage of oil on tankers in recent years) 
played an important role determining global oil inventories or the real price of oil after 
2009. Regarding the flow supply of oil, we showed that to the extent that flow supply 
shocks mattered for the real price of oil after 2010, they tended to increase the real 
price of oil with estimates ranging from 7 to 19 dollars. There is no indication that the 
supply side of the oil market has been a key determinant of the real price of oil, 
however. For example, between 20 and 23 dollars of the 29 dollar decline in the real 
price of oil since its peak in mid-2008 is accounted for by flow demand shocks 
compared with between -2 and +3 dollars explained by flow supply shocks.30 
Whereas for Kilian and Murphy (2013) there is no identified view how to model the 
global market for crude oil. It could be influenced by desidered shock. 
An important question is how to distinguish speculative demand shocks from flow 
demand and flow supply shocks in practice.  
Their structural VAR model is set-identified based on a combination of sign 
restrictions and bounds on the implied price elasticities of oil demand and oil supply. 
Some of these restrictions are implied by economic theory, while others can be 
motivated based on extraneous information. Impact sign restrictions alone are typically 
too weak to be informative about the effects of oil demand and oil supply shocks.  
As demonstrated in Kilian and Murphy (2012) in the context of a simpler model, it is 
essential that we impose all credible identifying restrictions for identification for the 
estimates to be economically meaningful. One such set of restrictions relates to bounds 
on impact price elasticities of oil demand and oil supply. 
                                                 30 Kilian, Lutz, and Thomas K. Lee. "Quantifying the speculative component in the real price of oil: The role of global oil inventories." Journal of International Money and Finance 42 (2014): 71-87. 
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Standard structural VAR models of the market for crude oil implicitly equate oil 
production with oil consumption and ignore the role of oil inventories.  
Traditionally these models have focused on shocks to the flow supply of oil and the 
flow demand for oil. They augmented the structural model to include shocks to 
inventory demand reflecting shifts in expectations about future oil supply and future 
oil demand that cannot be captured by flow demand or flow supply shocks. Such 
speculative demand shocks must be represented as shifts of the contemporaneous oil 
demand curve rather than the contemporaneous oil supply curve, even if the shift in 
expectations is about a cut in future oil supplies rather than an increase in future oil 
demand. The reason is that traders in anticipation of the expected oil shortage will buy 
and store crude oil now with the expectation of selling later at a profit.31 
The model KM (2013) showed that, nevertheless, the largest and most persistent 
fluctuations in the real price of oil since the 1970s have been associated primarily with 
business cycle fluctuations affecting the flow demand for crude oil.  
Of particular interest for recent policy debates is the sustained increase in the real price 
of oil from 2003 until mid 2008. 
They were able to provide direct evidence against the popular view that this increase 
was driven by speculators. This conclusion holds even for the 2007/08 period. Shifts in 
speculative demand played a more important role during several earlier oil price shock 
episodes, however, notably in 1979, 1986, 1990 and 2002. We showed that, without 
accounting for shifts in the speculative demand for oil, it is not possible to understand 
the evolution of the real price of oil during these episodes. 
 
2.2 Oil nature 
To the average consumer, it’s conventional to think, that there’s a singular worldwide 
market for this crucial energy source. 
In reality, there are different types of crude oil – the thick, unprocessed liquid that 
drillers extract below the earth – and some are more desirable than others. For 
                                                 31 Kilian, Lutz, and Daniel P. Murphy. "The role of inventories and speculative trading in the global market for crude oil." Journal of Applied Econometrics 29.3 (2014): 454-478. 
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instance, it’s easier for refiners to make gasoline and diesel fuel out of low-sulfur, 
or “sweet,” crude than oil with high sulfur concentrations. Low-density, or “light,” 
crude is generally favorable to the high-density variety for the same reason. 
Where the oil comes from also makes a difference if you’re a buyer. The less 
expensive it is to take delivery of the product, the more you’re willing to pay for it. 
From a transportation standpoint, oil extracted at sea has certain advantages over land-
based supplies, which depend on the capacity of pipelines. 
Because of these nuances, buyers of crude oil – along with speculators who will never 
actually take delivery of it – need an easy way to value the commodity based on its 
quality and location. 
Benchmarks such as Brent, WTI and Dubai/Oman serve this important purpose. When 
refiners purchase a Brent contract, they have a good idea of how good the oil will be 
and where it will come from.  
Today, much of the global trading takes place on the futures market, with each contract 
tied to a certain category of oil. 
Because of the dynamic nature of supply and demand, the value of each benchmark is 
continually changing. Over the long-term, a marker that sold at a premium to another 
index may suddenly become available at a discount. 
Crude oil is a naturally occurring substance which is found in widely differing 
amounts in various countries throughout the world. Oil is not used directly for any 
important purpose, rather it is refined and split into different products which are either 
used directly for final consumption or are in turn further processed. Different crude 
oils yield different proportions of these refined products, and since the value is related 
to the end uses, those crude oils yielding higher proportions of valuable by-products 
(petroleum motor spirit, diesel fuels, jet fuels, petroleum gas etc) will tend to sell at a 
premium relative to other crude oils.  
According to EIA (2010), heavy crudes tend to sell at a discount because of the 
negative effects on the efficiency of refining process. 
A given crude oil price determined on a particular day varies by location and date of 
delivery. Since crude oil is expensive to transport (long distance trade has to take place 
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since most of the major consumers produce little or no crude oil), the price at the point 
of production and at the point of import are quite different.  
Nakamura (2008), in a study of oil refining and markets showed that the margin for 
transport cost, insurance and handling cost can be substantial as long hauls may take 
several weeks and holding large inventories can be very expensive.  
Therefore, firms facing uncertain future demand often wish to purchase forward, that 
is to pay a price determined now for delivery later (e.g in one month time). Such a 
price can be quite different from the price for immediate delivery (spot) in the same 
market. However, over lengthy periods (using quarterly or annual average prices) the 
whole term structure of prices tends to move closely together.32 
Conventionally oil prices are quoted in US dollars per barrel whatever the point of 
delivery.  
According to Fattouh (2007), the oil pricing regime is based on formula pricing, in 
which the price of certain crude is set as a differential to a certain reference price. He 
outlined three crudes that have tended to be the reference points, which are explained 
below.33 
There are literally dozens of different oil benchmarks, with each one representing 
crude oil from a particular part of the globe, that's referring quality and original 
location of oil making a major impact on price. However, the price of most of them are 
pegged to one of three primary benchmarks: 
- Brent Blend (API 38°)34: roughly two-thirds of all crude contracts around the world 
reference Brent Blend, making it the most widely used marker of all. These days, 
“Brent” actually refers to oil from four different fields in the North Sea: Brent, Forties, 
Oseberg and Ekofisk. Crude from this region is light and sweet, making them ideal for 
the refining of diesel fuel, gasoline and other high-demand products. And because the 
supply is water-borne, it’s easy to transport to a distant locations.                        
                                                 32 Kaufmann, Robert K., and Ben Ullman. "Oil prices, speculation, and fundamentals: Interpreting causal relations among spot and futures prices."Energy Economics 31.4 (2009): 550-558. 33Fattouh, Bassam. "The drivers of oil prices: the usefulness and limitations of non-structural models, supply-demand frameworks, and informal approaches."EIB Papers 12.1 (2007): 128-156. 34 API is a scale devised by the American Petroleum Institute to measure the specific gravity of crude oil 
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According to Platts (2012), the current API gravity for Brent crude is estimated at 38 
degrees and the sulphur content at 0.45%, hence it is classified as sweet crude. The 
nearness of the North Sea to major refining industries and large market of North West 
Europe, has given this crude a central role over the past two decades; 
- West Texas Intermediate (API 40°): this crude commonly referred to as WTI, 
regarding oil extracted from wells in the U.S. and sent via pipeline to Cushing, 
Oklahoma.  
The fact that supplies are land-locked is one of the drawbacks to West Texas crude – 
it’s relatively expensive to ship to certain parts of the globe. The product itself is very 
light and very sweet, making it ideal for gasoline refining, in particular. WTI continues 
to be the main benchmark for oil consumed in the United States.  
WTI is lighter than Brent crude. According to Platts (2012), WTI contains about 0.3% 
sulphur and is rated as a sweet crude. WTI is expected to command a higher price than 
Brent crude - however, starting from late 2010, WTI began to sell at a discount due to 
rapid increases in crude oil production from tight oil formation. It is further reported 
that Brent has become more representative in the marginal cost of crude oil which led 
to the EIA in July 2012 to begin to publish Brent crude spot price forecast as against 
the WTI it normally used; 
- Dubai/Oman: this Middle Eastern crude is a useful reference for oil of a slightly 
lower grade than WTI or Brent.  A “basket” product consisting of crude from Dubai, 
Oman or Abu Dhabi, it’s somewhat heavier and has higher sulfur content, putting it in 
the “sour” category. Dubai/Oman is the main reference for Persian Gulf oil delivered 
to the Asian market. 
While Brent and US crude are particularly useful in pricing the best quality oil, a sour 
marker - heavier, but not too much so - is useful for lower quality crudes.  
They will represent an increasingly large part of global supply as sweeter sources grow 
increasingly mature. 
Using Dubai (around 31 API, 2.13pc sulphur) as a marker grade has become 
problematic after physical production plummeted to less than 100,000 barrels per day. 
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A potential solution is physically settled Oman crude futures (around 33.34 API, 
1.04pc sulphur), which since 2007 have traded on the Dubai Mercantile Exchange. 
Fattouh (2007) argued that the oil market has undergone structural transformation that 
has placed oil prices on a new high path, which according to him, is due to the 
emergence of new large consumers (such as China and India) and the geopolitical 
uncertainties in the Middle East - hence, the reaction of the oil market is generally in 
response to market fundamentals of supply and demand.35 
According to BP36 dated Brent averaged $98.95 per barrel in 2014, a decline of $9.71 
per barrel from the 2013 level the first annual average below $100 since 2010.          
Crude oil prices remained firm in early 2014 in the face of continued large supply 
disruptions, but fell sharply later in the year due to strong non-OPEC production 
growth combined with weaker consumption growth (relative to 2013) and OPEC’s 
November decision to defend market share.  
The differential between Brent and the US benchmark West Texas Intermediate (WTI) 
narrowed to $5.66 per barrel despite continued robust US production growth. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
However, the above graph shows that the trend between Brent and WTI crude oil 
prices is correlate, recording max spread in 2011-III and min spread in 1999-I. 
                                                 35 Fattouh, Bassam. "The drivers of oil prices: the usefulness and limitations of non-structural models, supply-demand frameworks, and informal approaches."EIB Papers 12.1 (2007): 128-156. 36 BP Statistical Review ofWorld Energy, June 2015 
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2.3 Importance of futures market 
There was once a time when buyers would primarily purchase crude oil on the “spot 
market” – that is, they’d pay the current price and accept delivery within a few weeks. 
But after the oil crisis of the late 1970s, refiners and government buyers began looking 
for a way to minimize the risk of sudden price increases. 
The solution came in the form of the crude oil futures, which are tied to a specific 
benchmark crude. With futures, buyers can lock in the price of a commodity several 
months, or even years, in advance. If the price of the reference crude rises significantly, 
the purchaser is better off with the futures contract. Many futures are settled in cash, 
although some allow for physical delivery of the commodity. 
Different crude contracts trade on different exchanges. Brent futures are available on 
ICE Futures Europe, while WTI contracts are sold chiefly on the New York 
Mercantile Exchange, or NYMEX. The influential Oman Crude Oil Futures Contract 
(DME Oman) has been marketed on the Dubai Mercantile Exchange since 2007. 
These contracts stipulate not only where the oil is drilled, but also its quality. 
Crude oil is exchanged in the futures market and sold at barrel, which contains 135kg 
of crude oil (159 lt.). In general crude oil market is very complex, due to the strong 
dependence of economic, politic and social factors of the world scenery. 
WTI refers to the contracts exchanged in NYMEX market, BRENT crude oil is 
exchanged at London International Petroleum Exchange and determines 60% of 
market prices, despite a limited production.  
2.4 Crude options 
In addition to futures, market participants can also invest in options that are linked to a 
particular crude benchmark. These derivatives are another important way to help 
mitigate price risk. Should the value of a certain crude marker skyrocket, the owner of 
a call option would have the right – though not the obligation – to buy a specific 
number of barrels at a pre-determined price. 
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However, not all options tied a crude benchmark are used for hedging purposes. 
Speculators are also major players in the market, betting that changes to supply or 
demand will drive the price of certain crude products higher or lower. 
Investors can also gamble on the what will happen to the difference, or spread, 
between two benchmarks.  
Participants typically analyze the fundamentals of a specific oil source and guess 
whether the gap between two markers will widen or close. Like traditional oil options, 
these “spread options” are available on major exchanges. 
Trading tends to be particularly heavy when one of the two benchmarks undergoes 
unusual volatility. For example, WTI-Brent spread options on NYMEX experienced 
record trading volume from 2011 to 2013 after a glut in U.S. crude sent WTI prices in 
a tailspin relative to Brent. 
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Chapter 3 
AN ESTIMATION OF VAR MODEL IN OIL MARKET  
 
In this chapter I describe the dataset explaining the identification and estimating an 
approach followed by a report of the main results. 
The analysis assesses empirically the effects of oil price shocks on the real economic 
activity.  
In order to see the macroeconomic effects of oil price shocks, and changes over time in 
the nature and size of those effects, I provide evidence of the main industrialised 
countries. 
The consequences are expected to be different in oil importing and in oil exporting 
countries. Whereas an oil price increase should be considered good news in oil 
exporting countries and bad news in oil importing countries, the reverse should be 
expected when the oil price decreases. Given that crude oil is a basic input to 
production, the theory normally predicts that supply-side consequences of oil price 
hikes include a contraction in overall economic activity and inflationary pressures. In 
addition, aggregate demand is expected to fall in oil importing countries, and go up in 
oil exporting countries.37  
As I have already mentioned the transmission mechanisms through which oil prices 
have an impact on real economic activity include both supply and demand channels, 
by affecting production, consumption and investment. 
Now I pass to describe the outline portrayed in my econometric approach examining 
how real domestic product of United States, United Kingdom, Italy, Germany, Euro 
area and Japan is affected by changes in international oil price using time series data 
from 1991 to 2014.  
 
 
                                                 37 Jiménez-Rodríguez*, Rebeca, and Marcelo Sánchez. "Oil price shocks and real GDP growth: empirical evidence for some OECD countries." Applied economics37.2 (2005): 201-228. 
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3.1 Methodology used for this research 
In order to see the effects of oil price shocks on economic activity I deal with an 
empirical study based on Vector Autoregression (VAR) approach. 
The VAR model is one of the most successful, flexible, and easy to use models for the 
analysis of multivariate time series. It is a natural extension of the univariate 
autoregressive model to dynamic multivariate time series. The VAR model has proven 
to be especially useful for describing the dynamic behavior of economic and financial 
time series. 38 
Because VAR models represent the correlations among a set of variables, they are 
often used to analyze certain aspects of the relationships between the variables of 
interest. 
VAR models describe macroeconomic dynamics by treating all variables as potentially 
endogenous.39 
VARs are tools through which is possible to explain the current values of a set of 
variables by past values of the variables included in examination. 
VAR analysis starts firstly by specifying and estimating a reduced form model for the 
data generation process (DGP) to check its adequacy: 
Yt = A1Yt−1 + . . . + ApYt−p + ut 
The reduced form model omits the fact that there might be mutual influences among 
the contemporaneous variables (within the period of observation) among Y1t , . . . , 
Ykt. This feature of omission is done in order to get consistent estimation of the 
coefficients through simple linear regression. 
Structural VAR (SVAR) seeks to identify structural relations among the variables; 
contemporaneous variables may appear as explanatory variables in some equations: 
                                                 38 Stock, James H., and Mark W. Watson. Forecasting output and inflation: the role of asset prices. No. w8180. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2001. 39 Moneta A.,Ciarli T. and Coad A., Exporting and productivity as part of the growth process: Results from a structural VAR, 2015 
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Γ0Yt = Γ1Yt−1 + . . . + ΓpYt−p + εt  
where Γ0 is a (k x k) matrix reflecting the instantaneous relations, Γi are the coefficient 
matrices of the lagged structural relations which reflect causal influences present in the 
DGP, νt  is always the deterministic part and εt = 0, i.e. it's a constant part. 
SVAR imposes restrictions on Γ0, so that it can be retrieved from the data. The 
matrices Γi (i= 1, ….. ,p) can be recovered from Γ0 joint with Ai resulting from the 
estimation of the (p) equation. 
These restrictions are placed on the base of considerations about LR effects or signs of 
the shocks. 
So some variables have an instantaneous impact on some other variables. 
Identifying the structural relations between the variables or identifying the structural 
shocks is the main concern of SVAR analysis which I present with empirical data in 
the next paragraph.40 
This is the outline adopted for the estimation of the SVAR model:  
- Unit root test 
Because the order of integration of a time series is of great importance for the analysis, 
a number of statistical tests have been developed for investigating it. 
There are several tests implemented testing the null hypothesis that there is a unit root 
against the alternative of stationarity of a DGP which may have a nonzero mean term, 
a deterministic linear trend and perhaps seasonal dummy variables. 
I analyse stochastic part to find integration and cointegration. 
The point of departure is an AR(p)  Yt = A1Yt−1 + . . . + ApYt−p + ut .  
This process has a unit root and is hence integrated if A(1)= 1- A(1)-…..-A(p)=0, 
which is identified as the null hypothesis against the alternative of stationarity of the 
process, that's when A(1) > 0. 
                                                 40 Moneta, Alessio. "Graphical causal models and VARs: an empirical assessment of the real business cycles hypothesis." Empirical Economics 35.2 (2008): 275-300. 
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For this purpose the model is reparameterized by subtracting Yt-1 on both sides and 
rearranging terms: 
∆Y t =ΠY t− 1+ ∑i=1
p− 1 Π i ∆Y t− i +ut  
where  Π = -A(1) and Bj = -(Aj+1+….+AP). 
The order of integration of the different series used in this model is analysed on the 
basis of the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test which for the pair of hypotheses    
H0: Π = 0 versus H1: Π < 0 is based on the t-statistic of the coefficient Π from an OLS 
estimation of the above equation.  
H0 is rejected if the t-statistic is smaller than the relevant critical value. If Π = 0 the 
series Yt has a unit root and is non-stationary, whereas it is regarded as stationary if the 
null hypothesis is rejected. 
So, I limit attention to the implications that non-stationary has for the specification of 
the VAR, for the estimation of the parameters and for the identification of structural 
shocks.  
- Lag length 
To a large extent the data will determine which time series model is appropriate. 
Before estimating any model, it's common to estimate autocorrelation and partial 
autocorrelation coefficients directly from the data. Often this gives some idea about 
which model might be appropriate.  
After one or more models are estimated, their quality can be judged by checking 
whether the residuals are more or less white noise, and by comparing them with 
alternative specifications. 
These comparisons can be based on statistical significance tests or the use of particular 
model selection criteria. 
The lag length for the VAR(p) model may be determined using model selection 
criteria. 
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The general approach is to fit VAR(p) models with orders p = 0, ..., pmax and choose 
the value of p which minimizes some model selection criteria.  
Model selection criteria for VAR(p) models have the form: 
IC(p) = ln |Σ˜(p)| + cT · ϕ(n, p) 
where Σ˜(p) = T−1 ΣTt=1 ˆεtˆεt is the residual covariance matrix without a degrees 
of freedom correction from a VAR(p) model, cT is a sequence indexed by the sample 
size T, and ϕ(n, p) is a penalty function which penalizes large VAR(p) models.  
The three most common information criteria are: 
- AIC (Akaike Information Criterion) (1973) 
- HQ (Hannan-Quinn Criterion) (1980) 
- BIC (Bayesian Information Criterion) also called SIC (Schawarz Information  
Criterion) (1978).41 
AIC(p) = ln |Σ˜(p)| + 2/T pn2    
HQ(p) = ln |Σ˜(p)| + 2lnlnT/T pn2   
BIC(p) = ln |Σ˜(p)| + lnT/T pn2  
The AIC criterion asymptotically overestimates the order with positive probability, 
whereas the BIC and HQ criteria estimate the order consistently under fairly general 
conditions if the true order p is less than or equal to pmax.42 
In fact, the VAR order is chosen such that the respective criterion is minimized over 
the possible orders p = 0 ….. pmax .43 
- Johansen test 
The Johansen (1988)44 procedure relies heavily on the relationship between the rank of 
                                                 41 Lutkepohl, H. (1991). Introduction to Multiple Time Series Analysis. Springer-Verlag, Berlin 42 Zivot, Eric, and Jiahui Wang. "Vector Autoregressive Models for Multivariate Time Series." Modeling Financial Time Series with S-Plus®. Springer New York, 2003. 369-413. 43 Lutkepohl, Helmut. Vector Autoregressive Models. No. ECO2011/30. European University Institute, 2011 44 Johansen, Søren. "Statistical analysis of cointegration vectors." Journal of economic dynamics and control 12.2 (1988) 
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a matrix and its characteristic roots. One intuitive explanation suggests that the 
Johansen procedure can be seen as a multivariate generalization of the augmented 
Dickey-Fuller test. The generalization is the examination of linear combinations of 
variables for unit roots.45 
More generally, if there are n variables, there are n − 1 possible cointegrating vectors. 
The Johansen test provides estimates of all cointegrating vectors. Just as for the 
Dickey-Fuller test, the existence of unit roots implies that standard asymptotic 
distributions do not apply. 
For the simpler case p = 1, it is simply ∆Yt = ΠYt−1 + ut. 
If the variables are cointegrated, then rank(Π) ≠ 0 and in fact rank(Π) = the number of 
cointegrating vectors. The number of cointegrating vectors is less than or equal to the 
number of variables n. If the rank of Π is less than n, then its determinant is zero. 
The Johansen tests are called the maximum eigenvalue test and the trace test.  
Let r be the rank of Π. This is the same as the number of cointegrating vectors. 
For both test statistics, the initial Johansen test is a test of the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration against the alternative of cointegration.  
The trace test seeks to see whether the rank of the matrix Π is r0. The null hypothesis is 
that rank(Π) = r0. The alternative hypothesis is that r0 < rank(Π) ≤ n, where n is the 
maximum number of possible cointegrating vectors. For the succeeding test if this null 
hypothesis is rejected, the next null hypothesis is that rank (Π) = r0 + 1 and the 
alternative hypothesis is that r0 + 1 < rank(Π) ≤ n. 
- Impulse response functions 
To study the relations between the variables, the effects of nonzero residuals or shocks 
are traced through the impulse response analysis. 
In applied work, it is often of interest to know the response of one variable to an 
impulse in another variable in a system that involves a number of further variables as 
                                                 45 Schmidt, Arlen David. Pairs trading: a cointegration approach. Diss. Stevenson University, 2008. 
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well. One would like to investigate the impulse response relationship between two 
variables in a higher dimensional system. Of course, if there is a reaction of one 
variable to an impulse in another variable we may call the latter causal for the former. 
In the reduced form VAR model (Yt = A1Yt−1 + . . . + ApYt−p + ut ) impulses, 
innovations or shocks enter through the residual vector  ut = (u1t ……. ukt)'. The 
marginal effect of a single nonzero element in ut can be studied conveniently by 
inverting the VAR representation and considering the corresponding moving average 
(MA) representation: 
 
 
where the Φj (j = 0, 1, 2, . . .) are the MA coefficient matrices and Ψj (j = 0, 1, 2, . . .) 
represent the impulse responses of the elements of Yt to the shocks εt−j (j = 0, 1, 2, ...). 
We have:  
 
 
 
 
 
where Aj = 0 for j > p. The impulse responses Ψj can therefore be obtained from the 
reduced-form VAR parameters Aj only if we know the SVAR coefficients matrix        
Γ0 = I − B. As the impulse responses are crucial for policy analysis, it is clear that we 
need to recover the SVAR representation for this purpose. The problem is that any 
invertible unit-diagonal matrix Γ0 is compatible with the coefficient matrices that we 
obtain by estimating the VAR reduced form. It is crucial then to find the correct Γ0 
which produces the right transformation Γ0ut = εt of the VAR error terms ut.46 
 
                                                 46  Moneta, A., Entner, D., Hoyer, P. O., & Coad, A. (2013). Causal inference by independent component analysis: theory and applications*. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 75(5), 705-730. 
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3.2 Empirical results 
The main objective of this study is to verify the macroeconomic effects of oil price 
shocks on real GDP. 
In doing this I have taken into account quarterly four/five-variable VARs for each 
country  (US, UK, Italy, Germany, Euro Area and Japan). 
For the analysis I select these variables: real GDP, CPI, short-term interest rate, long-
term interest rate and Brent oil price.  
Real GDP, CPI and Brent oil price are expressed in log whereas interest rates are in 
levels. 
So, I use a measure of economic activity, that's real GDP and I want to see through the 
impulse of Brent oil price shocks the response of real GDP (both growth and in levels) 
even if there could be an indirect influence since that the transmission channels are 
influenced by other variables too.  
Nevertheless, by using a multivariate specification I allow for a variety of shocks in 
addition to the oil shock that is my focus of interest. 
I begin with a country by country analysis, estimating quarterly four/five-variables 
VAR referred to the time span of 24 years taken into account, that's since 1991:1 to 
2014:4 (except for Euro area for which the time series start from 1995:I). 
Since that when is performing ADF test for 2 time series (the simple case) you need to 
decide the lag you want to use, I select one lag and I get that every country has a unit 
root, and so there is integration between the variables real GDP and Brent oil price.  
By comparing obtained results and in particular the test statistic w.r.t. critical values is 
possible to see if there is the presence of unit root and so if the evaluated variable is 
stationary or not. 
It's obvious that real GDP is non-stationary for every country. My results point out  
that Brent oil price is non-stationary.  
The shown below pictures illustrate that the test statistic is more than the critical value 
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of 5%, taken as benchmark. 
As regarding Italy, by the ADF test we have to presume integration of the same order, 
that's p(1), since that t > 5%: 
 
 
 
 
Also for Germany, there is the evidence of integration of the same order: 
 
 
 
 
There is one condition before running Johansen cointegration, that's all the variables 
should be non-stationary, as ADF has shown. 
Real GDP and oil price are non-stationary data, but if I convert them into first 
difference, they will become stationary. 
We compare test statistic w.r.t. critical values, taking as benchmark 5%. 
r = 0 it means that there is no cointegration between the two variables  
r <= 1 in this case we have cointegration between real GDP and oil price. 
When the test statistic is more than the critical values we can reject the null 
hypothesis, that's it is not correct and we can easily reject it because t>= 5%. 
The confirm of the results of integration is made through the Johansen test. 
In fact, as I said above, if the variables are cointegrated, then rank(Π) ≠ 0 and in fact 
rank(Π) = the number of cointegrating vectors. 
The trace test, advanced in Johansen, shows whether the rank of the matrix Π is r0. 
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The null hypothesis is that rank(Π)=r0.  
So, if for the rank r = 0 we have t > 5%, then the null hypothesis is rejected since that 
the trace statistic is more than the critical value. 
Then we can see that for r <=1 the trace is less than the critical value and so this 
confirm the presence of cointegration. 
The trace test for Italy confirms the presence of cointegration between real GDP and 
Brent oil price, and this means that there is long-run relationship between them: 
 
 
 
 
Also Johansen trace test for Germany illustrates the presence of cointegration between 
real GDP and Brent 
oil price: 
 
 
 
 
From my analysis appears that for two countries, that's Italy and Germany, there is a 
clear cointegration, and for remaining countries the results of cointegration test  is 
ambiguous. Hence, there is a linear relationship between the two variables. 
The last analysis performed for the results of the six countries is the IRF. This helps in 
knowing both short term and long term behaviour of real GDP with respect to oil price 
changes.  
In fact, the graphs stemming from the IRF analysis show that the effect of oil price 
variations affect the economy negatively. 
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In the short term there are generally swings in the macroeconomic structure.  
For almost every country, oil price shocks have a considerable negative effect on the 
real GDP growth in the short-term, then through many swings it reaches the 
stationarity in the long run. In fact, when the analysis of IRF is referred to the real 
GDP on levels I can notice that the GDP is completely negative. 
The only countries that have positive real GDP levels after oil price changes are Japan 
and Germany, even if the real GDP growth is interrupted by this shock. 
The results therefore imply that oil price shocks do affect the economies of countries. 
However, the results vary from one country to another and it is very important to 
understand the specificity of these economies.  
Below, I put the graphs arising from the IRF analysis, both for real GDP growth 
andreal GDP in level, involving four and five variables. 
 
Impulse response functions of real GDP growth at Brent oil price shocks, involving a 
four-variables approach: 
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Impulse response functions of real GDP growth at Brent oil price shocks, involving a 
five-variables approach: 
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Impulse response functions of real GDP at Brent oil price shocks, involving a        
four-variables approach: 
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Impulse response functions of real GDP at Brent oil price shocks, involving a         
five-variables approach: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
50 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
51 
CONCLUSION 
From what I have reported in this thesis, it is clear that the dynamics of the trend in oil 
prices are very complex, that is they affect our daily lives and make pressure over the 
economy, but the way and size of this pressure depend from the view which is adopted 
for the analysis of oil price effect since there is a continuous evolution of the factors 
involved in its fluctuation.  
Firstly because the figures that regulate the oil market (traders, companies, new control 
strategies at different national and international levels) that are more numerous and 
extremely diversified than in the past, help to accentuate oil prices swings; they affect 
the supply-demand ratio; they determine whether or not it is convenient to extract 
crude oil. 
So, just because oil continues to be the most important raw material in the energetic 
field, the oil market determines significative consequences in different areas, affecting 
in particular the lives of citizens. 
The most obvious solution could be to produce energy in a different way. The various 
issues can be solved only through a radical change of course at world level. Recent 
history shows that the current economic mechanisms create deep social inequalities 
that cause suffering and hate. 
If the relationships among peoples, such as the ones among individuals, aren't based on 
cooperation and solidarity, but only on profit, they will cause rebellion and violence. 
In turn, also the relationship with nature requires a deep change of mentality. 
Today's ecological crisis shows that man has exploited recklessly the land and the 
disastrous effects, already in place, even more will weight on future generations. 
The reality of oil market is in strong movement, it is affected by a climate of 
uncertainty in which it is difficult to predict both short and long term since that the 
increase/decrease of consumption/production, the role of speculators, which base their 
expectations on future prices, and the role of reserves, by which big operators on the 
market create confusion at world level, don't allow to achieve an univocal conclusion. 
52 
Moreover, every country is affected in different ways depending on its structural 
condition, the results therefore imply that oil price shocks do affect the economies of 
countries. Hence, since the results vary from one country to another it's important to 
understand the specificity of these economies.  
So, from the analysis carried out it is possible to conclude that the effects of oil price 
changes on economic activity have a negative influence, nevertheless the perspectives 
for oil prices are characterized by a strong degree of uncertainty. 
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Appendix 1: Data Sources 
The quarterly data adopted for the research were taking on Federal Reserve Economic 
Data – FRED – St.Louis Fed and the sources are: 
- Real GDP: for United States the data come from US Bureau of Economic 
from1991:I to 2015:1 (code: CDPC1), for Italy from 1991:II to 2014:II with source 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (code: 
ITARGDPQDSNAQ), for United Kingdom the source is GB. Office for National 
Statistics for the same time series of US (code: UKNGDP), for Germany Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development for the same period as Italy (code: 
DEURGDPQDSNAQ), for Euro area the source is Statistical Office of the European 
Communities (code: EUNNGDP) and for Japan the source is Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development from 1994:I to 2014:III (code: 
JPNRGDPQDSNAQ). 
- Nominal oil price: Crude Oil Prices: Brent – Europe, source US. Energy Information 
Administration (code: MCOILBRENTEU) 
- Short-term interest rate: 3-Month Treasury Bill: Secondary Market Rate for United 
States with source Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US) (code: 
TB3MS), 3-Month or 90-day Rates and Yields: Interbank Rates for Italy with source 
OECD (code: IR3TIB01ITM156N), 3-Month or 90-day Rates and Yields: Treasury 
Securities for the United Kingdom with source OECD (code: IR3TTS01GBQ156N), 
3-Month or 90-day Rates and Yields: Interbank Rates for Germany with source OECD 
(code: IR3TIB01DEQ156N), 3-Month or 90-day Rates and Yields: Interbank Rates for 
the Euro Area with OECD source (code:IR3TIB01EZQ156N) and 3-Month London 
Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR), based on Japanese Yen with source ICE Benchmark 
Administration Limited (IBA) (code: JPY3MTD156N) 
- Long-term interest rate: all these data come from OECD database regarding Long-
Term Government Bond Yields: 10-year: Main (Including Benchmark) for the United 
States, Italy, United Kingdom, Germany, Euro area and Japan with series ID 
(IRLTLT01USM156N), (IRLTLT01ITM156N), (IRLTLT01GBQ156N),  
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(IRLTLT01DEM156N),(IRLTLT01EZM156N) and(IRLTLT01JPM156N) respectively. 
- Consumer price index: The sources stem from OECD database. Total All Items for 
the United States (code: CPALTT01USQ661S), CPI of All Items in Italy 
(code: ITACPIALLMINMEI), CPI of All Items in the United Kingdom 
(code:GBRCPIALLMINMEI), CPI of All Items in Germany (code: 
DEUCPIALLMINMEI) Harmonized Prices: Total All Items for the Euro Area (code: 
CPHPTT01EZQ661N) CPI: Total, All Items for Japan (code:CPALCY01JPQ661N). 
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